When Blamey explained to Rowell that he had been ordered back to New Guinea by Curtin following the Australian withdrawal from Ioribaiwa ridge, Rowell argued that he still should not have come. This was despite admitting that he did not understand the political situation in Australia. Blamey asked a senior officer who had accompanied him to Port Moresby, Major-General Samuel Burston, to counsel Rowell to help resolve the situation.
Both men knew each other well, but this was to no avail. Rowell further exacerbated the situation by denying Blamey access to situation reports compiled from information from forward commanders Carlyon , In a military structure, there can only be one result from such insubordination and Rowell admitted as much in a letter to Blamey the following year Hetherington , On the morning of 28 September after further heated discussions, Rowell was relieved of his command by Blamey.
Edgar , , who examined the psychological state of senior officers in the Kokoda campaign, might well have included Rowell on his list. Concurrently, he was concentrating his 21 st Brigade to provide relief for Maroubra Force. Along the Kokoda Trail, he was responsible for a series of desperate delaying actions against the advancing Japanese.
Potts, who shared the extremely arduous conditions on the Trail with his soldiers, was held in great esteem by them. He was noted for his energy and mental strength. Growing pressure mounted on Potts to take offensive action against the Japanese. In particular, it originated from MacArthur in Australia who, with faulty intelligence on the strength of the Japanese and with no understanding of the conditions under which the fighting occurred, believed that the Australian soldiers were not prepared to fight.
Potts was unable to do this and withdrew to a high ridge to the south of Efogi. There, for the first time, Potts was able to assemble his complete brigade, even though two of his battalions were under-strength from the incessant fighting.
Both of his superior officers, Allen and Rowell, were concerned at the loss of Myola and the lack of offensive action. This was because no liaison officer had been deployed forward of divisional headquarters Braga , , which was a serious flaw in the command structure Horner , In lieu of trained liaison officers, Rowell had used war correspondents, but they were not equipped for the task.
Following probing patrols, the Japanese attacked in force from Efogi and simultaneously made a flanking incursion from the west close to the rear of the Australian position, which isolated brigade headquarters. Many examples of selfless bravery by the Australians were evidenced in this battle. Brune , , again without military analysis, claimed that Potts had covered almost every contingency. These assertions cannot be sustained. Potts sited three independent battalion positions, plus a separate brigade headquarters.
This had the potential to compromise the security of his line communications as his radio back-up was unreliable. He lost control of the battle almost from the outset when the Japanese incursion cut his telephone lines Edgar , After further adjustment by the commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Geoffrey Cooper, the battalion was located about yards above the old mission hut.
The position was on very steep ground with poor visibility. Therefore, the defensive position was very vulnerable to enemy fire, particularly indirect fire. On the night of 7 September , approximately 90 Japanese using local guides scaled the ridge from the west carrying a Juki machine gun. This was a standard Japanese tactic to bypass the main force and cut off their withdrawal route.
The feat of the Japanese should be acknowledged, but the western approach is no steeper than many other parts along the Trail. The Japanese incursion was not detected by any patrols or sentries and the Japanese established a dominant position by first light on the Trail between the brigade headquarters and the rear battalions.
Ham , p. With the loss of control by Potts which included command of the brigade mortars , there was always going to be the problem of timing an orderly withdrawal. It passed to the east of the established Japanese position on the Trail, but was poorly defined, causing difficulty for night movement.
The battalion was missing-in-action for nearly two weeks. A report sent back from Menari with the first liaison officer Captain Geoffrey Lyon to reach the 21 st Brigade, said in part that Brigade Hill could be held for only two to four days as there was no water on the position and supplies were short. Potts was relieved of his command on 10 September and reported back to Allen and then Rowell on 11 September On 23 September, Rowell returned Potts to command of 21 st Brigade, which had by then withdrawn to Itiki, as he believed that Potts had gained from his experience on the Trail Paull , With their strong personalities, Blamey and Potts inevitably argued at Sogeri, exacerbating the situation.
Their difference in rank could lead to only one result. Potts had a dislike for authority Edgar , , an example of which was a discourteous discussion he had with the Minister for the Army on one of his visits Edgar , Major General Arthur Allen was also a veteran of the Great War and had the singular distinction of commanding at each level from platoon commander to divisional commander on active service. The withdrawal of 21 st Brigade back along the Kokoda Trail has been discussed above.
It was not until the battle at Brigade Hill that Allen sent a liaison officer forward to report on the fighting conditions. This was a significant omission by Allen who was not able to understand fully the difficulties Potts faced. Nor was he able to move forward himself as he was also responsible for the defence of Port Moresby Braga , His responsibility for Port Moresby was removed on 9 September and subsequently he was able to move his headquarters to the Kokoda Trail at the village of Uberi.
This decision had more to do with the eventual dismissal of Allen than any direct intervention by Blamey. Allen had long standing differences with Herring dating back at least to their previous service together in Palestine in Their personalities and social background had little in common.
Prior to his arrival in New Guinea, Herring formed the opinion that he wanted a new leadership team when he took command. He favoured Dougherty to become Commander, 21 st Brigade which had now eventuated , and he wanted Major-General George Vasey [8] as one of his divisional commanders Braga , However, Wurth made it clear that Curtin prosecuted the war with all his energy when it became inevitable.
McKernan criticises Blamey for taking his wife to his Cairo headquarters in - while many Australian troops were missing their families - and for taking his son from the fight in Greece, where other Australian soldiers became prisoners of the Germans. McKernan also says Blamey should have made clear to the Australian government his opposition to the Greek campaign. McKernan criticises Blamey for never visiting the troops in Tobruk, for unfairly dismissing officers in New Guinea and, above all, for his words at Koitaki.
Blamey's supporters says he was just careless with words. Yet he was not included in the people named in as having made Australia great. When Blamey's name came up, company director and old soldier Alan Coates told other selectors: "Has anyone in this room served under the prick?
I buried three men because of his arrogance … I'll never forgive him. A nation takes notice when a hero's halo slips. Command of the Kokoda operations did not go smoothly. He criticised the Australian forces for retreating along the Kokoda Track, and commanders who were unable to stop the Japanese were quickly replaced.
By early September , the Japanese were within 48 kilometres of Port Moresby, and could see the lights of the town. But they were now far from their own supply base on the northern coast, and faced the difficulties of moving supplies and weapons along the narrow, mountainous track.
Their men were now suffering from the same hunger and disease that had earlier affected the Australian troops. At the same time, American forces had occupied the island of Guadalcanal, in the Solomon Islands, east of Papua. They could use the island as a base to attack Japanese shipping. In response, the Japanese command decided to concentrate on Guadalcanal and withdrew their forces from Papua, even though they were within sight of their objective in Port Moresby.
Australian and American troops followed the retreating Japanese along the track, and fought them when they reached their coastal base at Buna-Gona. They defeated the Japanese, but Allied casualties were extremely high. Overall, more than Australian troops died in fighting throughout the Kokoda operation, and more than were wounded. Over 4, soldiers suffered from tropical diseases.
0コメント